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SCHOOL VOUCHERS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:
SEVEN QUESTIONS FROM MADISON'S
MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE
Vincent Blasit
In the immediate aftermath of the Revolutionary War, many up-
standing citizens of the fledgling state of Virginia were not pleased.
They were, in fact, appalled by the decline they perceived in the state
of public morals. Newspaper editorials, sermons, and speeches in
public assemblies resounded with references to the recent upsurge in
gambling, whoring, cockfighting, and public drunkenness. That such
departures from the straight and narrow are not uncommon in post-
war periods, following all the social dislocations of military mobiliza-
tion, was no consolation to Virginians eager to show a doubting world
that government by the people could work.1
The root of the problem, in the view of many, was that the
churches of the new commonwealth no longer enjoyed the influence
or support they had taken for granted during the colonial period. In
particular, the Episcopalian Church, formerly the colony's established
Church of England, was suffering. Many of its splendid edifices had
been damaged in the fighting; fully half of its clergy were now exiled
or discredited former tories. Those ministers who remained were hav-
ing trouble eliciting sufficient voluntary contributions from congrega-
tions unaccustomed to that method of ecclesiastical support.2
Into this breach leaped that eloquent opportunist, Patrick Henry.
He sponsored in the Virginia Assembly a daring proposal to reinvigo-
rate the public morality.3 His plan was to harness the fiscal powers of
the state in the service of religious teaching, all to the end of civic
t Corliss Lamont Professor of Civil Liberties, Columbia Law School and David Lur-
ton Massee Professor of Law, University of Virginia. This Essay is a revised version of the
Irvine Lecture, delivered October 23, 2000 at the Cornell Law School. Thanks to Kent
Greenawalt, James Ryan, Seana Shiffrin, and Steven Shiffrin for their constructive criti-
cisms and to Nancy Clare Morgan and Logan Sawyer for their research assistance.
1 See RHYs ISAC, THE TRANSFORmATION OF VIRGINIA: 1740-1790, at 275-78 (1982).
2 See THOmAS E. BUcKLEy, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA,
1776-1787, at 81-82 (1977).
3 The proposal was entitled, "A Bill 'Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the
Christian Religion,' 1784." Id. at 188. The text of this proposal is reproduced in Appendix
B.
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virtue.4 A "General Assessment" would be instituted in the form of a
property surtax. In contrast to the traditional use of the taxing power
to support a single, preferred religion, Henry's proposal permitted
each taxpayer to specify which Christian denomination should receive
his payment. Those who did not wish to support a church could di-
rect their assessment to a proposed common school fund.5 The bill
provided that a record be kept of each taxpayer's choice of recipient,
to be posted in the county courthouse, "there to remain for the in-
spection of all concerned. ' 6 Revenues would then be distributed in
accordance with these taxpayer directions. Churches could use their
allotments to pay for the salaries of their clergy, to provide places of
divine worship, and to "none other use whatsoever."7
One member of the Virginia Assembly took particular exception
to Henry's proposal, the representative from Orange County, James
Madison. 8 Despite his relative youth, by 1784 Madison had a well-for-
mulated position and some hard-earned political savvy regarding the
sensitive issue of church-state relations. Eight years earlier he had
helped to draft and steer to enactment the religious liberty clause of
the new Virginia Constitution.9 Madison viewed the General Assess-
ment as a patent violation of that constitutional commitment and a
profound threat to Virginia's experiment in republican government.
He devoted the ensuing year to the cause of defeating Henry's propo-
sal: first by convincing the legislature to postpone action on the mea-
sure until after the next election, then by organizing an appeal to the
voters to elect assembly candidates who would oppose the General As-
sessment, and finally by engineering its defeat at the subsequent legis-
lative session. 10 In the course of this campaign, Madison wrote a
succinct polemic, the Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious As-
4 See WiLLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY 24-29 (1986).
5 See id. at 26.
6 BucKL Y, supra note 2, at 189.
7 Id. The bill contained one explicit exception to this restriction on how the funds
could be used: "except in the denominations of Quakers and Menonists, who may receive
what is collected from their members, and place it in their general fund, to be disposed of
in a manner which they shall think best calculated to promote their particular mode of
worship." Id. The Quakers and Menonists had no clergy or church buildings so the Gen-
eral Assessment would have been of little or no benefit to them absent such an exception.
With the exception, however, they were free to use tax-generated funds for proselytizing
expenses, something the other sects were not free to do.
8 See id. at 113.
9 IRVING BRNaT, THE FOURTH PRESIDEr: A LIFE OFJAMES MADISON 34-35 (1970).
10 For a detailed account of the political maneuvering, by Madison and others, that
led to the defeat of the General Assessment, see BucKLEY, supra note 2, at 109-53.
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sessments," which constitutes the most powerful and influential state-
ment of his views on the subject of religious liberty.
Madison's sense of the stakes in this struggle can be discerned
from his uncharacteristic hyperbole when informing Jefferson, then
in France, of the defeat of the General Assessment and the enactment
in its stead of a bill drafted years earlier by Jefferson outlawing such a
tax and forbidding religious tests for office. "I flatter myself," Madison
told his friend, that the legislative triumph of their shared principles
had "in this country, extinguished forever the ambitious hope of mak-
ing laws for the human mind."' 2
Madison's passion on this subject is manifest. Not so obvious,
however, is why a proposal so relatively ecumenical and evenhanded,
with its broad class of beneficiaries and provisions for taxpayer specifi-
cation of recipients, should have aroused in Madison the spectre of
religious persecution.' 3 What, exactly, was he so bothered about?
The answer to that question might be of more than purely histori-
cal interest. Today, the most vigorously contested question of church-
state relations concerns the propriety and constitutionality of using
tax-generated public funds to subsidize private, including religious,
schools. The most ambitious subsidization proposals-ambitious in
terms of departure from past practices, asserted educational benefits,
and amounts of money involved-employ in one or another form the
mechanism of vouchers. The parents of a school-age child receive a
voucher from the government; they give that voucher to the accred-
ited school to which they choose to send their child; the government
then redeems the voucher by paying the school a specified sum from
the public treasury. With vouchers, parents, not government officials,
decide which schools get public funding and in what amounts. If the
parents decide to send their child to a religious school, tax-generated
11 JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in JAMES
MADISON: WRITINGS 29 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). The Memorial and Remonstrance is repro-
duced in Appendix A.
12 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 22, 1786), in 1 LETTERS AND
OTHER WRTNGS OFJAMES MADISON 211, 214 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1867).
13 Madison's rhetoric in the Memorial and Remonstrance is uncharacteristically strident
and alarmist. See, e.g., MADISON, supra note 11, para. 2, at 30-31 ("The Rulers who are
guilty of such an encroachment.., are Tyrants. The People who submit to it ... are
slaves."); id. para. 7, at 32-33 ("During almost fifteen centuries has the legal establishment
of Christianity been on trial. What have been its fruits? More or less, in all places, pride
and indolence in the Clergy, ignorance and servility in the laity, in both, superstition, big-
otry and persecution."); id. para. 9, at 33 ("Instead of holding forth an Asylum to the
persecuted, [the proposed General Assessment] is itself a signal of persecution. It de-
grades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in Religion do not bend to
those of the Legislative authority."); id. para. 15, at 35-36 ("Either we must say, that [the
legislature] may ... despoil us of our very right of suffrage, and erect themselves into an
independent and hereditary Assembly or, we must say, that they have no authority to enact
into law the Bill under consideration.").
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funds subsidize religious teaching. In the typical voucher proposal,
no provision restricts the use of those funds to the purely secular as-
pects (if such there be) of the religious school's endeavor.14
Proponents of vouchers argue that the First Amendment permits
this form of public funding of religious education because the benefi-
ciaries are not limited to preferred religions, or all religions, or even
all private schools; a scheme so inclusive raises no serious problems of
coercion, preferment, or endorsement along religious lines. Moreo-
ver, because the funds are distributed according to decisions made by
private actors-the parents-the relationship between church and
state entailed in a voucher system is not constitutionally problematic.
As a matter of principle, so the argument goes, vouchers present none
of the concerns that inform the First Amendment's prohibition of the
establishment of religion. 15
Opponents of vouchers agree that the church-state issues raised
by the voucher mechanism are distinctive, straightforward, and resolv-
able at the level of basic principle. There, however, the agreement
ends. As opponents view the matter, what is distinctive about vouch-
ers is that coercively generated tax revenues pay for unambiguously
religious instruction. This is objectionable on its face without the
need to assess the purposes or particular effects, the subtle prefer-
ences and endorsements, the competing conceptions of neutrality,
the insidious entanglements, and the long-term institutional conse-
quences that must be explored to resolve more difficult cases of possi-
ble establishment. For good measure, opponents observe that the
scale of the subsidy means that tax revenues supplant rather than sup-
plement the traditional, voluntary sources of funding for religious ed-
ucation, a feature that distinguishes vouchers from the much smaller,
more specialized and restricted subsidies that occasionally have been
upheld.16
I believe that both sides of this controversy are wrong in claiming
to have a simple, dispositive argument. In terms of either first princi-
ples of political theory or the implications of the modern case law, the
voucher issue is complicated and daunting. Messy inquiries into
meanings and consequences, and much else besides, are unavoidable.
14 For a good general explanation and defense of the proposal for educational vouch-
ers, see JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALTV. SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITrrION, AND
CIVIL SOCIETY (1999). For an excellent collection of essays about various aspects of the
voucher controversy, see STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN & FRANK R. KEMERER, SCHOOL CHOICE AND
SOCIAL CONTROVERSY (1999).
15 SeeJackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 617-19 (Wis. 1998); Scott A. Fenton, Com-
ment, School Voucher Programs: An Idea Whose Time Has Arrived, 26 CAP. U. L. Rxv. 645, 670
(1997).
16 See Steven K. Green, The Legal Argument Against Private School Choice, 62 U. CIN. L.
REv. 37, 68-73 (1993).
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My project here is a limited one. I will not attempt to determine
whether a voucher system that includes religious schools violates the
Establishment Clause as elaborated by the Supreme Court, or is in
tension with the collective original understanding of the various ac-
tors who drafted and ratified the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Instead, I will inquire just how much we might learn in addressing
these and related questions, in legislative forums no less than judicial,
from what James Madison said when explaining his opposition to the
General Assessment. I look to Madison not in his role of Father of the
Constitution or principal author of the First Amendment, but rather
his role as an astute, engaged critic of one funding proposal. I do not
claim to know what he would have thought of vouchers were he with
us today. I consider that question as impossible to answer as it is be-
side the point to ask. My aim is to discover whether we can under-
stand and resolve the voucher issue better by attending to the
principles Madison invoked and the considerations he emphasized
when he was confronted with a different kind of broadly based pro-
gram of support for religion that distributed its subsidy according to
the private choices of citizens. It is the heuristic Madison, not the
authoritative Madison, that interests me.
A close reading of the Memorial and Remonstrance yields, in my
judgment, seven questions pertinent to the voucher issue. They are:
First, is the formal inclusion of church-operated schools in a pub-
lic funding scheme, including the transfer of public funds directly to
such religious institutions, a violation of the principle that religion
must be wholly exempt from the cognizance of the state? In collo-
quial terms, does the degree of institutional interaction and recogni-
tion entailed in a voucher scheme violate the principle of separation
that Madison held dear?
Second, can a voucher system that neither prefers nor excludes
any religion ever amount to the type of establishment that Madison
opposed?
Third, is a voucher system an effort to, in Madison's words, "em-
ploy Religion as an engine of Civil policy," a strategy he termed an
"unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation"?17 What is wrong
with civil authorities drawing upon the resources, material and other-
wise, of religions in the pursuit of a civic good such as quality or di-
verse education?
Fourth, would a voucher system lead participating religions to be-
come too dependent on the state over time, to the detriment of their
religious purity and vitality?
17 MADISON, supra note 11, para. 5, at 32.
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Fifth, would the fact that certain religions receive a substantial
state subsidy and may come to depend on it lead them to be less will-
ing to criticize public officials or mobilize resistance to public policies,
thereby diminishing what has historically been one of the major
checks on governmental injustice and neglect?
Sixth, would the ongoing implementation of a voucher system,
with all the fiscal and regulatory decisions that would be entailed, gen-
erate contests and resentment along religious lines that might, in
Madison's words, "destroy that moderation and harmony which the
forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with Religion has produced
among its several sects"?18 Or would the decision to include religious
schools in the public financing of education actually reduce the "ani-
mosities" and 'jealousies" that Madison considered an enduring
threat to the republic?
Seventh, would a voucher system deny to any citizens "equal titie
to the free exercise of [r]eligion" by subjecting some to peculiar bur-
dens and others to peculiar benefits so far as the capacity to practice
their religions is concerned; or conversely, can the move to a voucher
system be defended as equality enhancing in this regard?19
These are the pertinent Madisonian questions for the voucher
controversy, and except for the first two, they are not easy to answer.
The first two questions have a conceptual emphasis. To answer
them, one must appreciate what Madison meant by "cognizance" and
"establishment." Taken together, the last five questions reflect
Madison's penchant for thinking about issues of liberty and legitimacy
in structural terms. He had little faith in legalistic guarantees-
"parchment barriers" he dismissively called them.20 Instead, he fo-
cused on such matters as institutional incentives, checks and balances,
object lessons from the past, and scenarios of decay and abuse. His
assumptions regarding how power would be exercised were pessimis-
tic.2 1 His deepest concern was with the tyranny of the majority. 22 He
considered the abuse of power by majorities to be more likely to occur
18 Id. para. 11, at 34.
19 Id. para. 4, at 31 (emphasis omitted).
20 Letter fromJames Madison to ThomasJefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), inJAMES MADISON:
WR=INGS, supra note 11, at 418, 420.
21 In Federalist No. 51, Madison explains:
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man
must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a
reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to con-
trol the abuses of government. But what is government itself but the great-
est of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government
would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor
internal controls on government would be necessary.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
22 See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 20, at 421.
[Vol. 87:783
SCHOOL VOUCHERS
the smaller the political community.23 He sought to forestall and con-
tain abuses of power by means of perspicacious institutional design.
His approach to the subject of church and state was in this spirit.
If we are to be guided by Madison in grappling with the voucher
issue, we need to consider, under pessimistic assumptions, what would
be the institutional consequences for religion and for governance of
that proposed restructuring of educational financing. In contrast, the
efforts of both voucher proponents and their adversaries to resolve
the constitutional issue in peremptory fashion, without attending to
difficult assessments of institutional dynamics, represent a distinctly
un-Madisonian approach. With emphasis on institutional considera-
tions, I will address each of the seven questions in turn.
First, does making religious schools an integral part of the public
financing of education violate Madison's absolute principle that relig-
ion must be "wholly exempt' from the "cognizance" of the state?24 If
"cognizance" in this context means "knowledge," "awareness," "no-
tice," or "acknowledgment,"25 surely a voucher system takes such cog-
nizance of religion. Just as surely, under that interpretation a no-
cognizance principle is a practical impossibility in the modern welfare
state, or for that matter even in the minimal state of Madison's day.
This difficulty has led some to question the very principle of separa-
tion of church and state.26
Such an argument from impossibility vanquishes a straw man.
"Cognizance," so the dictionary specifies, has an alternative meaning,
and doubtless it is the one Madison employs: "responsibility," 'Juris-
diction. '2 7 In the first two paragraphs of the Memorial and Remon-
strance, Madison develops the point, derived from Locke, that the civil
magistrate has no responsibility whatsoever for the way each citizen
understands and discharges his duty to the Creator.28 This does not
23 This claim, arguably Madison's most significant general observation about politics,
is defended in detail in Federalist No. 10. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
24 MADISON, supra note 11, para. 1, at 30.
25 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 222 (10th ed. 2001).
26 See, e.g., William D. (Bill) Graves, Evolution, The Supreme Court, and the Destruction of
ConstitutionalJurisprudence, 13 REGENT U. L. REv. 513, 556-57 (2001).
27 MERRIAI-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICaONARY, supra note 25, at 222.
28 As Madison wrote in Memorial and Remonstrance:
The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and con-
science of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these
may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable right.... It is the
duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage and such only as
he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent, both in order
of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.
MADISON, supra note 11, para. 1, at 30. Madison continued: "[I]f Religion be exempt from
the authority of the Society at large, still less can it be subject to that of the Legislative
Body." Id. para. 2, at 30. John Locke provided the classic defense of this proposition in his
1689 Letter Concerning Toleration. For a good edition of the Letter, with extensive commen-
2002]
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mean that the state must take no account of the religious beliefs and
practices of its citizens, only that it has no authority to attempt to in-
fluence, facilitate, or promote those beliefs and practices. That re-
sponsibility belongs exclusively to the individual believer and the
voluntary associations he forms.29
The General Assessment violated this injunction, Madison con-
cluded, because by its very logic it sought to encourage the people of
Virginia to embrace certain religious tenets as taught by religious au-
thorities. True, the ultimate objective of the bill, at least on the face
of it, was public morality, not salvation.30 Religious belief was seen as
a means to that civic good. Moreover, no taxpayer was coerced to
believe anything or to support any religious practice-recall the opt-
out provision whereby one's tax could be directed to the general
school fund.31 Nevertheless, had the General Assessment passed, the
state would have embraced a strategy that gave it a stake in the relig-
ious beliefs of its citizenry. The state's purpose-whether intermedi-
ate or ultimate does not matter-was to stimulate religious belief.
That, in Madison's view, is a form of taking cognizance of religion in
the sense of taking responsibility for it. The magistrate, under
Madison's principle of separation, has no such jurisdiction.
Does a voucher system likewise place the state in the position of
taking responsibility for the religious beliefs of its citizens? I think
not. There are secular educational objectives served by a voucher sys-
tem that are not bound up with the religious beliefs of its participants.
Even when those secular educational benefits are delivered by relig-
ious authority figures, acting out of religious motives and functioning
in a "pervasively sectarian" environment, the state has not adopted an
educational strategy that gives it a stake in the religious beliefs of its
citizens. Were religious devotion to wane as a general matter, or were
different theologies to flourish among the populace, the secular edu-
cational project need not suffer, just as the civic purposes served by an
art museum that displays religious paintings do not depend to any
significant degree on the religious beliefs of the patrons who view the
art. That could not be said about the General Assessment.
tary, see JOHN LocKE, A LETTER CONCERNING ToLERATfION IN Focus (John Horton & Susan
Mendus eds., 1991).
29 See BucKu.EY, supra note 2, at 135.
30 The preamble to the General Assessment began: "Whereas the general diffusion of
Christian knowledge hath a natural tendency to correct the morals of men, restrain their
vices, and preserve the peace of society .... " Id. at 188.
31 The proposed General Assessment provided that when a taxpayer failed to specify a
Christian denomination to receive his tax payment, "the Sheriff shall pay the amount
thereof... into the Public Treasury, to be disposed of under the direction of the General
Assembly, for the encouragement of seminaries of learning within the Counties whence
such sums shall arise, and to no other use or purpose whatsoever." Id. at 189.
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In this respect, a voucher system differs not only from the Gen-
eral Assessment, but also from the dubious practices, justified in the
name of so-called civil religion, whereby public institutions invoke as-
sertedly ecumenical (though almost invariably theistic) religious ritu-
als, symbols, and precepts to solemnize civic endeavors. Prayer in
public schools is, of course, the most salient example. 32 Whatever the
value of such efforts to set the civic tone, they are more efficacious the
more citizens hold the beliefs that are invoked. That puts government
in the position of taking cognizance of religion, and Madison would
have none of it, as his opposition to legislative chaplains and
thanksgiving proclamations attests. 33
This distinction helps to explain how Madison, a realist in polit-
ics, could have insisted that the state cannot require a citizen to "con-
tribute three pence only of his property"34 to support a religious
establishment. Surely he realized that some portion of a dissenter's
taxes pays for public services, such as law enforcement and roads, that
benefit churches no less than other members of the community.
What coerced taxes, no matter how small, could not support, in
Madison's view, was a religious "establishment," by which he meant
any instance of government taking "cognizance" of, that is responsibil-
ity for, religion. Madison's concept of separation could be severe, but
it was a separation of functions and purposes, not some quixotic at-
tempt to achieve a hermetically sealed spacial separation. Viewed in
this light, his unqualified injunction against the state taking cogni-
zance of religion seems to me not to be violated by a voucher system.
The second question about vouchers that derives from the Memo-
rial and Remonstrance concerns the role of exclusivity and favoritism in
Madison's conception of establishment. Can an arrangement that
employs no religious criteria for eligibility, and in other respects ex-
hibits no preference among religious beliefs, ever be an establishment
of religion as Madison used the term? The General Assessment pro-
vided only for allotments authorized by individual taxpayers to Chris-
tian denominations. No provision allowed the Jews, Muslims, and
atheists of the Commonwealth to direct their taxes to the teachers of
their beliefs. The best they could do was to specify that their taxes go
to a common school fund. In the Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison
describes the General Assessment as an establishment of Christianity
and warns that it could lead to a narrower establishment of particular
32 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 316-17 (2000); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962).
33 SeeJames Madison, Detached Memoranda, inJAms MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
89, 91-93 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985).
34 MADISON, supra note 11, para. 3, at 31.
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Christian sects.35 Would a more inclusive scheme such as the proto-
typical voucher plan fall outside his conception of establishment?
The answer is: not necessarily. We ought not to assume that
Madison considered the General Assessment's denial of access to pub-
lic funding to non-Christian denominations to be the fatal defect.
Most of the arguments he mounted against the proposal take the form
of claims relating to undesirable incentives and consequences. Many
of those arguments, which I will canvass shortly, would impeach a sub-
sidy that supported all religions without limitation. At no juncture in
his sustained campaign against the General Assessment did he so
much as imply that the proper remedy might be a broadening of the
class of beneficiaries. 36 Indeed, at one stage of the legislative process
the bill actually included non-Christian religions in its coverage, and
Madison worked tirelessly to defeat it at every stage. For Madison, the
concept of establishment referred to structural relationships that,
under pessimistic assumptions, threaten to corrupt the state, religious
institutions, or both. There is no reason to think that he thought
those risks were confined to non-inclusive arrangements.3 7 A school
voucher program may not amount to an establishment of religion in
Madisonian terms, but the fact that such a program is not confined to
religious schools and is administered without religious favoritism by
no means proves the point.
35 See id.
36 In a letter to Madison written during the initial debate in the Virginia Assembly,
Richard Henry Lee expressed his support for the General Assessment but added, "I fully
agree with the presbyterians, that true freedom embraces the Mahomitan and the Gentoo
as well as the [Christian] religion and upon this liberal ground I hope our Assembly will
conduct themselves." Letter from Richard Henry Lee to James Madison (Nov. 26, 1784),
in 2 THE LETrERS OF RICHARD HENRY LEE 304, 304-05 (James Curtis Ballagh ed., 1914).
Madison never answered Lee on this point. Two weeks earlier Madison had written to
James Monroe explaining that "[i ]n its present form [the General Assessment] excludes all
but [Christian] Sects. The Presbyterian Clergy have remonstrated [against] any narrow
principles, but indirectly favor a more comprehensive establish [ment]." Letter fromJames
Madison to James Monroe (Nov. 14, 1784), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 89, 90
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901). Madison predicted to Monroe that "the bottom will be en-
larged [and] that a trial will be made of the practicability of the project." Id. Notice that
Madison characterized even the scheme that would include non-Christian religions as an
establishment. See id. And despite his prediction that the proposal would be broadened to
include other religions, Madison marshalled all his tactical skill to prevent the Bill's consid-
eration in the 1784 session so as to buy time to organize opposition to the General Assess-
ment. See MILLER, supra note 4, at 33-34.
37 See BucKLEY, supra note 2, at 108. Buckley explained, "During the course of debate,
the decision had been reached to liberalize the bill by dropping the word 'christian' and
opening up the measure to any group which might consider itself a religion." Id. This
decision was then reversed. Madison accused the proponent of the reversal, Benjamin
Harrison, of "pathetic zeal." Id. There is no evidence, however, that Madison had with-
drawn his fierce opposition to the bill during the period when it included non-Christians,
just as there is no suggestion in his correspondence withJames Monroe and Richard Henry
Lee that the inclusion of non-Christians would alter his view that the General Assessment
was an objectionable "establishment" of religion. See MADISON, supra note 11, para. 3, at 31.
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If the first two questions, the conceptual queries, can be answered
with considerable confidence with respect to educational vouchers,
the remaining five, the inquiries indicated by the Memorial and Remon-
strance relating to structural incentives and practical consequences,
cannot. To these I now turn.
The third question is whether a voucher system amounts to an
effort to employ religion as an engine of civil policy. Madison ob-
jected to the General Assessment on this ground. He characterized
the strategy as "an unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation."38
Would a voucher system that included parochial schools run the risk
of perverting the means of salvation to serve civil objectives?
One cannot help but be struck by the concern for the purity and
integrity of religion-notice the key term "unhallowed"-that reso-
nates in Madison's protest. He believed that the ambitions of civil
rulers pose a constant threat to religion, even when those ambitions
manifest themselves in schemes of co-optation rather than persecu-
tion.8 9 In the context of the General Assessment, his concern was that
the clumsy effort to use religion to teach public virtue interjected the
civil mechanism of compulsory taxation into the relationship of volun-
tary support that some denominations considered of the essence. At
the time, the smaller evangelical denominations whose political en-
ergy Madison enlisted-particularly the Baptists, but others as well-
thought that a financially secure clergy led to uninspired preaching
and insufficient zeal, if not outright corruption. These were traits
they ascribed to the established Anglican preachers of the colonial
period. Had the General Assessment passed, it would have been all
the more difficult for the evangelical congregations to keep their min-
isters on a short leash, something they fervently desired to do. 40
As a general matter, the "means of salvaion"-to wit, religious
teachings and obligations-cannot help but lose some of their sacred
authority when they are employed for reasons other than the purely
spiritual. Even in the unlikely event that points of doctrinal refine-
ment and emphasis do not change when civil objectives enter the mix,
38 MADISON, supra note 11, para. 5, at 32.
39 Madison observes that "ecclesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the pu-
rity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation." Id. para. 7, at 32. Locke
makes the same point repeatedly.
[W]e must acknowledge that the church.., is for the most part more apt
to be influenced by the court, than the court by the church. How the
church was under the vicissitude of orthodox and Arian emperors is very
well known. Or if those things be too remote, our modem English history
affords us fresher examples, in the reigns of Henry VIII, Edward V, Mary,
and Elizabeth, how easily and smoothly the clergy changed their decrees,
their articles of faith, their form of worship, every thing, according to the
inclination of those kings and queens.
LocKE, supra note 28, at 31.
40 See Bucamr, supra note 2, at 178.
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the justifications and reasons for obedience do. Moreover, as Alexis
de Tocqueville, an avid student of Madison, later observed, when re-
ligion becomes a tool of state policy, the rivalries, resentments, and
suspicions of civic life tend to be turned back on the religions them-
selves, to the great detriment of religious authority.41
These are important considerations, however subtle and specula-
tive they may be. At least Madison thought so. But how do they bear
on the issue of vouchers?
The first point to notice is that the problem of unhallowed per-
version does not disappear simply because the employment of religion
as an engine of civil policy occurs pursuant to the intervening private
choices of parents who opt to send their children to religious schools.
Whatever the mechanism that gives shape to the arrangement, we still
must ask whether religious teachings or authorities are being used to
serve civil objectives in a manner that cheapens those teachings or
diminishes those authorities.
Should we be concerned that the phenomenon of religious
teachers being, in a manner of speaking, on the public payroll might
impeach their spiritual authority? That the payroll in question is dis-
tributed according to parental choice rather than official discretion
does not eliminate its public character, given its provenance in taxa-
tion. As with the General Assessment, one might worry that the finan-
cial incentives and perceptions introduced by public funding might
alter the character of the religious calling, and thereby perhaps the
spiritual authority of those who teach in the name of religion. To
Madison, that would be no small matter.
As always, it is the incremental consequences that must be assessed.
Religious authority no doubt is threatened by many of the conditions
and arrangements of modern life, but the incremental contribution of
a voucher system to the diminution of religious authority may not be
significant. For years, religious schools, like their secular counter-
parts, have sought state accreditation in order to satisfy compulsory
education laws and fulfill prerequisites for higher education and em-
ployment. In that respect, such schools function as agents of the state
and their students see themselves as pursuing state-sanctioned creden-
tials as well as religious truth. I fail to perceive how the introduction
of public funding exacerbates the diminution of religious authority
that already occurs in the regulatory state.
An opponent of vouchers might contend that Madison's notion
of "unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation" is not fully cap-
41 ALExiS DE TOCQUEVLLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 311-12 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
Vintage Books 1990) (1945). On Tocqueville's study of Madison, see Bernard E. Brown,
Tocqueville and Publius, in RECONSIDERING TOCQUEVILLE'S DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 43 (Abra-
ham S. Eisenstadt ed., 1988).
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tured by this inquiry into diminished authority. In this view,
Madison's basic point is that it is wrong in principle-sacrilegious re-
ally--to employ religion for worldly purposes. The objection to "un-
hallowed perversion" is not dependent on a claim about specific
consequences; it is more fundamental than that.
This line of argument accurately describes Madison's view of per-
version but fails to explain how a school voucher program amounts to
such a perversion. Unless the means of salvation are used to pursue the
end of civil education, Madison's concern is not activated. This
"wrong-in-principle" notion would prove too much if every form of
involvement of religious institutions in the multifarious endeavors of
the welfare state were characterized as employing, and thereby risking
the perversion of, the means of salvation. In one sense, of course, that
would be a plausible characterization: a religious institution inevitably
draws on its spiritual resources to some degree to effectuate any pro-
ject it undertakes. But if the means of salvation are not invoked ex-
plicitly or otherwise assume prominence in the specific enterprise
narrowly defined, the enlistment of the religious institution in the civil
project should not be regarded in itself as a perversion of those
means. The very fact that students in religious schools have all sorts of
non-religious reasons to obtain secular knowledge and training in ad-
dition to religious instruction indicates that the means of salvation
need not be perversely exploited whenever a religious institution un-
dertakes to serve the state's mundane educational objectives. Even
the omnipresence of spiritual reference in some pervasively sectarian
schools that might participate in a voucher program would fall short
of the perversion represented by the General Assessment: clergy paid
to employ scripture to teach the state's moral message.
If vouchers do not amount to an unhallowed perversion of the
means of salvation, are they nevertheless problematic because they
threaten to compromise the purity and efficacy of religion by placing
religious institutions in a position of financial dependency on the
state, or on the state-created market? This is the fourth question on
my list of seven.
Madison's discussion of the General Assessment is explicit, in fact
strident, about how the experience of financial establishment corrupts
religious institutions. He enumerates what he terms "the fruits" over
fifteen centuries of such an arrangement: "[m] ore or less in all places,
pride and indolence in the Clergy, ignorance and servility in the laity,
in both, superstition, bigotry and persecution."42 He contrasts the
Golden Age of Christianity, "in which its Teachers depended on the
voluntary rewards of their flocks."43 We might be tempted to confine
42 MADISON, supra note 11, para. 7, at 32.
43 Id. para. 7, at 33.
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Madison's dependency critique to the historical practice of establish-
ing a single religion and supporting it without regard to the wishes of
the populace. But remember that he offered these observations about
corruption while challenging a funding proposal that permitted each
taxpayer to specify which denomination would receive his coerced
contribution and allowed him to direct his tax payment away from all
religions to the common school fund. Madison's concern in this pas-
sage is not preference, but rather corrupting dependency.
It is not difficult to imagine scenarios whereby the availability of
vouchers could corrupt religious education. Participation in a
voucher scheme might be conditioned on the willingness of partici-
pating schools to admit students without regard to their religious be-
liefs, to eschew religious tests in faculty hiring, and to refrain from
requiring students to attend religious ceremonies or profess religious
beliefs.44 Any of these restrictions could change the character of the
religious education offered. Apart from regulations of this sort, which
might violate the Free Exercise Clause, market pressures introduced
by a voucher scheme could create incentives for a religious school to
modify its curriculum and general character in a more ecumenical
direction so as to appeal to a broader range of voucher-wielding con-
sumers. These and other such effects are far from implausible.
We might think that an Enlightenment figure like Madison could
only applaud such a softening of sectarian parochialism. Not so, in
my opinion. Whatever his own beliefs-and they have remained
something of a mystery to his many biographers45-Madison was im-
pressed by the value of religious pluralism. He took from his epic
battle to defeat the General Assessment the lesson that a free govern-
ment depends, as he put it in Federalist No. 51, on the flourishing of a
"multiplicity of sects" no less than a "multiplicity of interests."46 He
44 Under the Milwaukee voucher program upheld in Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d
602 (Wis. 1998), participating private schools were required to select students "on a ran-
dom basis ... except that they may give preference to siblings already accepted in the
school." Id. at 617. Moreover, "the private schools cannot require the students participat-
ing in the program to participate in any religious activity provided at that school." Id. The
Cleveland voucher program invalidated in Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir.
2000), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 23 (2001), provided that participating schools "are required
to follow the program's priority rules regarding the placement of students and may not
discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background; advocate or foster unlaw-
ful behavior; or teach hatred of any person or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, na-
tional origin, or religion." Id. at 948-49. Sectarian schools participating in the program
were permitted, however, to require "mandated participation in religious services." Id. at
949.
45 Cf Ralph L. Ketcham, James Madison and Religion, inJAMEs MADISON ON RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY, supra note 33, at 175, 175 ("A serious effort to discover the reality of Madison's
relationship to religion quickly runs afoul of his effective efforts to obscure this aspect of
his life.").
46 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 21, at 324. The thesis that Madison's successful
struggle to defeat the General Assessment, made possible by the fears and consequent
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was acutely aware that his legislative triumph owed much to the secta-
rian fears and resentments of the more evangelical denominations. A
few years later, Madison won a hard-fought and close victory over his
friend James Monroe for the seat from the Virginia Piedmont in the
First Congress. That political outcome, without which we would not
have the First Amendment as we know it, was made possible by the
strong support Madison once again received from the evangelicals. 47
For personal as well as philosophical reasons, he looked kindly on re-
ligious enthusiasm, including-indeed, especially-politically mobil-
ized religion with an edge.
Some might argue that even if the financial temptations of a
voucher system could corrupt religious education, the religions them-
selves should be free to decide wherein lies the road to perdition. Re-
ligions eager to enjoy the benefits of access to the public fisc, as many
are today, have the greatest stake in safeguarding their own purity and
integrity. If vouchers really do threaten to cause a religious dumbing
down, so to speak, these denominations need not take the bait.
There is something to this anti-paternalism point, but it should
not be considered conclusive. The General Assessment did not re-
quire any denomination to receive public funds, but that did not as-
suage Madison's dependency concerns. He did not, and we should
not, assume that the religious leaders likely to be tempted and cor-
rupted by public funding are the exclusive custodians of the religious
traditions they represent. In Madison's day, disputes over church-
state relations were heavily bound up with struggles for influence
within the various religions.48 As mentioned earlier, probably the
fiercest opposition to the General Assessment came from devout con-
gregants fearful of clerical financial independence. 49 Such anti-cleri-
calism seems anachronistic in the disputes of today, but
intradenominational struggles over priorities certainly have not
passed from the scene. The selective availability of public money can
influence those struggles. Consider the possible impact of a voucher
scheme on a denomination that historically has devoted its resources
to missions aimed at the poor and not to sectarian education. Imag-
ine the dynamics if, under a voucher system, the leaders of the relig-
ion feel pressured to invest in sectarian education simply to keep up
with rival denominations that are successfully recruiting and then
proselytizing voucher students. Apart from that kind of scenario, we
might fear that a voucher system would induce religions to entrust
political mobilization of a multiplicity of sects, informed the positions he expounded in the
Philadelphia Convention and The Federalist, is advanced in LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED
FIRE OF LIBERTY 76-107 (1995).
47 See BRANT, supra note 9, at 223-24.
48 See BucKt=a, supra note 2, at 119-127, 178.
49 See id. at 178.
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their educational programs not to the most devoted and skilled teach-
ers of the faith, but to persons who possess the entrepreneurial talents
necessary for success in the competition for students. That might be
considered a form of corruption that is none the less so for having
been freely chosen, under the circumstances, by the proper religious
authorities.
The anti-paternalism objection is not dispositive, but other objec-
tions might be. Notions of corruption, distortion, enervation, even
compromise are meaningless in the absence of a baseline. We can say
with some confidence that a school voucher program will affect relig-
ious priorities and practices. Not so obvious, however, is whether
those effects overall will be detrimental to the particular religions that
participate. Dependency on public resources is a dangerous condi-
tion for religion, to be sure, but so is the condition of competing in
the educational marketplace with the well-financed institutions-and
some would say the religiously subversive orthodoxies-of the modern
welfare state. Even in the absence of vouchers, sectarian schools that
are supported wholly out of tuition payments and voluntary contribu-
tions have financial incentives to recast their offerings to recruit stu-
dents, in some settings in the direction of a demanding and strongly
parochial religious curriculum, in other settings the reverse. Such
schools and the denominations from which they spring may also be
tempted to place religious entrepreneurs at the helm.
There is much more to be said on this point, but for now I con-
clude with some misgiving that although the possible corrupting ef-
fects on religion of a voucher system are serious, they are not so clear
or pronounced that Madison's warnings about the dangers of depen-
dency should be considered telling against the arrangement. Never-
theless, an observer who would learn from Madison ought to place far
more emphasis on these risks of dependency than has occurred to
date in the voucher debate.
So far I have discussed only the costs of financial dependency to
the religious mission. There is another cost flowing from the reliance
of religious institutions on public funding that concerned Madison
greatly. This is the possibility that religions entangled in a fiscal em-
brace with government will cease to function as uninhibited critics of
the hand that feeds them. The fifth of my seven questions addresses
this danger.
In the Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison has this to say about
established religions: "in many instances they have been seen uphold-
ing the thrones of political tyranny: in no instance have they been
seen the guardians of the liberties of the people."50 In contrast, con-
50 MADISON, supra note 11, para. 8, at 33.
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sider the role that religions not dependent on government funding
have played throughout American history, most recently in the civil
rights, antiwar, and anti-abortion movements. The Federalist Papers
and his other essays on government make clear that Madison saw re-
ligion as a crucial oppositional force in politics and a vital check on
the tyranny of the majority, but only when its role is properly struc-
tured to prevent it from serving instead as an instrument of popular
tyranny.51
So the question is: how likely is it that a religion that comes to
depend on the tax-generated revenues available to it in a voucher sys-
tem will, on that account, desist from challenging, or tone down its
criticisms of, the government that redeems its vouchers. To answer
this question, we must focus on the incremental chilling effect, if any,
of a voucher program. For many years now, religious organizations
have received substantial subsidies, including property tax exemptions
and grants for a wide variety of endeavors such as medical research,
higher education, hospital and nursing home care, and poor relief.52
Moreover, many religious organizations contract with government to
provide social services. 53 Public officials incensed by criticism from
religious leaders seldom lack for levers of financial or regulatory
retaliation.
On the other hand, the sheer magnitude of the funding involved
in at least some proposed voucher programs might raise distinctive
problems of financially motivated political reticence or sycophancy on
the part of church leaders. And even if a voucher system could be
structured to make it almost impossible for a religious institution to
suffer targeted retaliation, contingent general policies relating to
funding levels and conditions on participation could be so important
to a religion that it might hesitate to make enemies in high political
places.
In my judgment, the key factor that is likely to determine the
effect of a voucher system on political criticism is whether a significant
number and variety of private schools, including religious schools,
prove to be viable under the arrangement. If so, general policies of
voucher administration will have a broad impact on a variety of con-
stituencies. As a result, the manipulation of those policies to punish
critics of government ought to encounter significant resistance.
Madison's strategy of relying on a multiplicity of interests and a multi-
plicity of sects could well have contemporary purchase in this context.
51 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison); Letter from James Madison to
Thomas Jefferson, supra note 20, at 420-21.
52 See Ira C. Lupu, The Increasingly Anachronistic Case Against School Vouchem, 13 NonE
DA EJ.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'y 375, 380 (1999).
53 See id. at 375.
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But how likely is it that a voucher system will generate a multiplic-
ity of private schools? Surely that is. the goal of many proponents.
Much will depend on the local circumstances. In some places we can
expect numerous educational experiments, at least in the short run.
In other locales, very few if any private schools will operate. In terms
of protecting political critics, there is much to be said for instituting a
voucher system on a statewide basis, thereby increasing the number
and variety of participants. Recall Madison's argument in Federalist No.
10 that the size of the political community is crucially important to the
preservation of liberty.54
On balance, I do not find convincing the objection that a well-
designed voucher program is likely to cause religions to forfeit their
political independence. One can even imagine that if the reform
works as its proponents hope, more students will be educated out
from under the civic orthodoxies taught in the public schools. Upon
entering the political sphere, such students ought on that account to
be less inclined to accept the policies that reflect those orthodoxies.
Deweyites might shudder but Madisonians should rejoice.
This prospect of the waning of the common school, which may or
may not occur under a voucher system, suggests the importance of the
sixth question on my list, relating to political strife.
Madison objected to the General Assessment in significant part
because he thought such public funding of religion would "destroy
that moderation and harmony which the forbearance of our laws to
intermeddle with Religion has produced among its several sects."55
The very appearance of the proposal, he asserted, "has transformed
that Christian forbearance, love and charity, which of late mutually
prevailed, into animosities and jealousies, which may not soon be ap-
peased."56 Madison called the General Assessment "this enemy to the
public quiet."57 Would the publicly funded balkanization of primary
and secondary education have this result?
I can think of three major sources of political discord that a
voucher program might introduce. First, some taxpayers will resent
seeing even a symbolic portion of their tax contribution go to the
teaching of religious tenets they reject. Second, some religions, for
example those that already heavily invest in education, inevitably will
benefit more from a voucher system than others. The jealousies to
which Madison alluded in the Memorial and Remonstrance were due
largely to the fact that the smaller, proselytizing religions saw the Gen-
eral Assessment, which provided that public funds could be spent only
54 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 83-84 Games Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
55 MADISON, supra note 11, para. 11, at 34.




on salaries for clergy and church buildings, as a bailout of the Episco-
pal Church, with its peculiar problems of clergy recruitment and
building damage and its lack of emphasis on proselytizing. 58 One can
imagine similar suspicions of favoritism attending decisions regarding
the specific design and implementation of a voucher system. Third, a
population increasingly educated in enclaves of religious homogene-
ity may, by virtue of reduced exposure to persons who think differ-
ently, exhibit more of the inbred animosities that so concerned
Madison. Even if a high degree of civic common ground is now be-
yond our reach and perhaps undesirable in any event, some capacity
in the populace to compromise and to accept political defeats is indis-
pensable. Too much religious parochialism may reduce that capacity,
at least when it is not leavened by sustained experiences of personal
interaction beyond the confines of the faith.
Each of these threats to moderation and harmony strikes me as
real even if difficult to estimate. Much would seem to turn on what
kind of voucher plan is implemented. For example, it might be possi-
ble to permit a taxpayer to check a box on her return specifying that
her tax allotment can only go to support the public schools. That all
of us see our taxes put to uses to which we object does not justify
ignoring the distinctive political strains that are introduced when re-
ligious sensitivities are added to the equation. In deciding upon the
amount of the voucher payment and the regulatory strings that go
with it, we must take great care to minimize the risk of differential
denominational impact. This priority counsels against restrictions on
religious criteria for student admissions and faculty hiring. Voucher
schools should also be permitted, if they so choose, to require all stu-
dents to participate in worship services.
Intelligent design can counteract some of the sources of discord
that vouchers might introduce, but can do little, I am afraid, to miti-
gate the religious enclave problem. Educational enclaves are not
good for the democratic process, but I fear that as a society we have
already traveled rather far down that path. Nevertheless, a voucher
system would almost certainly exacerbate the phenomenon of relig-
ious clustering.
In evaluating the probable impact of vouchers on political good
will, we must not assume that all is rosy with the status quo. Parents
who pay both school taxes and private tuition feel imposed upon. Bit-
ter struggles over what is taught in the public schools often divide
parents along religious lines.59 The mushrooming phenomenon of
homeschooling constitutes, for most parents who undertake it, a spe-
58 See BucKLEY, supra note 2, at 175-76.
59 See, e.g., STEPHEN BATES, BATTLEGROUND: ONE MOTHER'S CRUSADE, THE RELIGIOUS
RIGHT, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF OUR CLASSROOMS (1993).
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cies of civic alienation. Vouchers cannot eliminate these tensions and
antipathies, but they might reduce some of the pressure.
My bottom line on this point is tentative and tortured. The stakes
here, at least to a Madisonian, are high indeed. That may counsel risk
aversion, but I think we run risks by leaving undisturbed the current
pre-voucher pattern of escalating, self-righteous, and often ill-tem-
pered sectarian involvement in the politics of public education, fol-
lowed by bigoted and paranoid reaction to that phenomenon. On
balance, the priority Madison attached to preserving a spirit of moder-
ation and harmony in political life does not, I conclude, provide a
sufficient reason to consider a voucher system an imprudent or un-
constitutional mixing of religious and civil institutions.
The seventh and final Madisonian question concerns the princi-
ple of equality. There can be no dispute that considerations of equal
treatment lay at the core of Madison's conception of religious liberty,
both his aversion to any form of religious establishment and his em-
phasis on the notion of "free exercise." His debut in prominent politi-
cal debate came in 1776 when as a twenty-five-year-old delegate to the
Virigina Constitutional Convention he succeeded in altering the word-
ing of the proposed guarantee of religious freedom. In preference to
the traditional Lockean argot of "toleration" submitted by no less a
figure than George Mason, Madison persuaded the convention to
adopt his own more robust and egalitarian formulation: "all men are
equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dic-
tates of conscience. ' 60 No fewer than five of the fifteen paragraphs of
the Memorial and Remonstrance make explicit appeals to equality.61 Sev-
eral others invoke notions of natural right and the rule of law62 that
for Madison and his intellectual milieu were bound up with egalita-
rian premises: equally the creatures of God, entering civil society on
equal terms, equality before the law, and the like. Madison objected
to the General Assessment in no small part because he did not believe
it treated the citizens of Virginia equally in the free exercise of their
religion. Undoubtedly, moreover, these considerations of unequal
treatment were a dominant factor in the resounding political defeat of
the General Assessment that he engineered. 63
Given the relative inclusiveness of the proposed scheme for fund-
ing churches and clergy, not to mention the opt-out provision permit-
ting taxpayers to direct their payments to the general education fund,
one wonders exactly why Madison objected to the General Assessment
60 RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 72-73 (1971).
61 See MADISON, supra note 11, paras. 4, 8-9, 14-15, at 31-36.
62 See id. paras. 1, 2, 13, at 30-31, 35.
63 See MILLER, supra note 4, at 38-41.
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so fiercely on grounds of equality. What demanding conception of
"equal title" or "equal rank of Citizens" did he employ?64
The narrowest answer to this question is the one Justice Clarence
Thomas advanced in Rosenberger v. University of Virginia:65 Madison
considered the General Assessment to deny the equal right to free
exercise because it would have excluded non-Christian religions from
the funding program.66 Although the General Assessment would not
have, required the small number of professed Jews, Muslims (mostly
Turks), Deists, agnostics, and atheists of the Commonwealth to sup-
port religions in which they did not believe-they could have directed
their taxes to the school fund-they could not have advanced the
teachings of their creeds with the aid of the tax collector's coercive
authority. In that regard, the proposal disadvantaged them in com-
parison to their Christian counterparts.
As explained above, this interpretation of Madison's objection to
the General Assessment fails to account for the fact that he never
urged a broadening of the coverage scheme and maintained his oppo-
sition even when the bill before the Assembly for a time did provide
for the inclusion of non-Christian religions. 67 Of course, Madison
considered the General Assessment even in its most inclusive form to
be objectionable for reasons other than inequality, for example the
dangers of dependency and the improper assumption of civil respon-
sibility for religious flourishing.68 That being the case, his equality-
driven objections might have been confined to the possible impact on
non-Christians.69 However, in light of the context of religious disputa-
tion in which Madison expressed his equality concerns, far the better
interpretation is that he perceived the General Assessment to deny
citizens the "equal title to the free exercise of Religion" 70 because of
its unequal treatment of and impact upon various Christian
denominations.
On its face, the bill provided for special treatment of the Quakers
and Menonists by exempting them from the restriction applied to all
other denominations that funds provided by the government be used
only for buildings and salaries for the clergy.71 This exemption was
perfectly logical because as a matter of theology the Quakers and Me-
64 MADISON, supra note 11, paras. 4, 9, at 31-32, 33-34.
65 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
66 See id. at 853-56 (Thomas, J., concurring).
67 In private correspondence with Madison several prominent Virginians expressed
support for the General Assessment on the condition that it be expanded to include non-
Christian religions. It is noteworthy that Madison apparently was unimpressed with this
proposed solution. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
68 See supra notes 28-31 and 42-43 and accompanying text.
69 MADISON, supra note 11, para. 9, at 33.
70 Id. para. 4, at 31 (emphasis omitted).
71 See BucLaEy, supra note 2, at 189.
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nonists did not erect edifices for worship and did not have clergy. 72
Nevertheless, the exemption did permit them to use public funds to
finance proselytizing efforts, an activity other denominations such as
the Baptists and Presbyterians had emphasized in late-eighteenth-cen-
tury Virginia.73 In the Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison alluded
specifically to this favorable treatment of Quakers and Menonists:
"Ought their Religions to be endowed above all others with extraordi-
nary privileges by which proselytes may be enticed from all others?" 74
He also asserted that the General Assessment would subject some
sects to "peculiar burdens."75 He did not specify what those peculiar
burdens might be or which sects would suffer them, but a good
surmise is that he was referring to the burdens that would be borne by
Christians who believed that only voluntary contributions engendered
inspired preaching and manifested the proper devotion. Of course,
under the General Assessment, congregants who wished to deny their
clergy a secure public subsidy could always direct their taxes to the
general school fund. But that decision, posted for public inspection
in the local courthouse, 75 might arouse suspicions of impiety and in
any event would leave less money available for voluntary support of
one's church.
Madison's opposition to the General Assessment derived in part,
it seems, from a concern about its unequal impact on different reli-
gions, calibrated in terms of specific practical burdens and benefits.
In addition, he discerned a different kind of inequality in the propo-
sal. He described the General Assessment as "a signal of persecu-
tion. 77 He argued that "[i] t degrades from the equal rank of Citizens
all those whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those of the Leg-
islative authority. 78 He predicted that this illiberal signal would cause
some Virginians to emigrate and would warn away other persons seek-
ing a haven for the free exercise of religion. 79 This characterization
seems overwrought, given the General Assessment's relative breadth,
formal evenhandedness, respect for taxpayer choice, and opt-out pro-
vision for those who preferred not to support religious activities.
What could Madison have been thinking?
72 See id. at 108 (discussing the bill's exception for Quakers and Mennonites because
"these communities had no formal clergy").
73 See IsAAc, supra note 1, at 161-77.
74 MADISON, supra note 11, para. 4, at 32.
75 Id. para. 4, at 31.
76 See BucKa.Y, supra note 2, at 189. Curiously, this privacy-invading procedure, jar-
ring to modem sensibilities, elicited no specific protest from Madison.
77 MADISON, supra note 11, para. 9, at 33.
78 Id.
79 See id. paras. 9, 10, at 33-34.
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Perhaps he thought that the failure of the proposal to include
non-Christian religions would degrade the Commonwealth's few Jews
and Muslims from "the equal rank of Citizens." That interpretation
does not explain his reference to immigration and emigration, how-
ever, for non-Christians in eighteenth-century Virginia were demo-
graphically insignificant and certainly not the haven-seekers of the
popular imagination. Rather, Madison believed that the General As-
sessment would degrade from "the equal rank of Citizens" certain
Christians, namely those whose teachings and practices did not fit
them so well to serve the state's project of civic moral instruction,
those Christians perhaps who viewed such a commission as an "unhal-
lowed perversion of the means of salvation."80
Are any of these various equality concerns present in the case of
educational vouchers? There can be little doubt that some religions
would benefit far more than others from the availability of public
money to cover the general operating expenses of private education.
One religion especially, the Roman Catholic Church, has developed
over the years an extensive infrastructure for providing religious edu-
cation and a culture that encourages members of its faith to seek such
schooling.81 Other religions have an educational infrastructure up
and running, if on a smaller scale. During the last two decades there
has been an upsurge in the number and variety of religions operating
schools, 82 but there remain many faiths in many locales that do not do
so. One would hope and expect that some religions previously unable
to provide sectarian education would be financially empowered by a
voucher system to undertake that ambitious project. Even so, under
no imaginable scenario would an educational voucher program bene-
fit religions equally, or in proportion to their memberships, or accord-
ing to any other principle of equitable distribution. How much
should this bother a Madisonian?
To answer that question, one needs to distinguish the problem of
unequal material benefits and burdens from that of unequal civic sta-
tus. On the dimension of material impact, it is wildly unrealistic, at
least in the modem welfare state, to require all laws to distribute bur-
dens and benefits equitably among religious faiths. Laws exempting
conscientious objectors from military service, subsidizing hospitals
and nursing homes, prohibiting the use of hallucinogenic drugs, re-
stricting the alteration or destruction of architectural landmarks, of-
fering tax deductions for charitable contributions, and exempting
buildings used for religious purposes from property taxes all benefit
or burden some faiths and their adherents much more than others.
80 Id. para. 5, at 32.
81 See VrRrrri, supra note 14, at 82-86.
82 See Lupu, supra note 52, at 391.
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Madison was nothing if not a realist. Perhaps he would have objected
in principle to the modem welfare state, in which case he probably
has little to teach us concerning how to preserve religious freedom in
such a state and how to prevent religious disagreements from disa-
bling such a state. Or perhaps we should read him to employ a con-
ception of equality less draconian than the proposition that all laws
must benefit or burden all religions to a roughly equal degree.
One way to narrow Madison's equality principle is to link it more
closely with the concept of "free exercise." Today we tend to look
upon "equal protection" and "free exercise" as wholly separate no-
tions, both fundamental to our constitutional structure but not con-
ceptually integrated. That is not how Madison viewed the matter. He
objected to the General Assessment in large part because he consid-
ered the inequality built into the arrangement to be not simply unfair
but a threat to the capacity of the disfavored sects to practice their
religion "according to the dictates of Conscience. 8 3 A crucial source
of his concern was the claim by some denominations, especially the
more evangelical Christian sects such as the Baptists, that compulsory
support of their clergy impaired the fundamental relationship that
must obtain between preachers and their congregations.84 That the
unequal denominational impact in this respect was not due to a differ-
ential inscribed on the face of the statute, and could not be proved to
be intended by the legislature-although the more evangelical sects
had their suspicions 85-did not forestall Madison's objection. With
regard to burdens and benefits that implicate defining elements of a
religious practice, his equality standard was indeed demanding. With
regard to differential denominational impact more generally,
Madison's argument in the Memorial and Remonstrance is either inappli-
cable or inconclusive.
Should we consider the differential denominational impact of ed-
ucational vouchers to be a threat to the capacity of adherents of the
disfavored faiths to engage in the free exercise of their religion? As
discussed above,8 6 some religions might experience pressure to get
into the education business, if only to retain adherents tempted by the
high-quality schools run by rival sects. Such a reluctant move would
alter the priorities of a religion, but should we consider it an impair-
ment of free exercise comparable to the practical inability to keep
clergy dependent on voluntary contributions? Even without vouchers,
83 MADISON, supra note 11, para. 4, at 31.
84 See Rhys Isaac, "The Rage of Malice of the Old Serpent Devil": The Dissenters and the
Making and Remaking of the Virginia Statutefor Religious Freedom, in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 139, 150-53 (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan eds., 1988).
85 See THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 157 (1986).
86 See supra text following note 49.
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religions that operate good schools exert competitive pressure on rival
faiths, particularly in areas where the public schools are mediocre.
To my mind, the consideration that looms the largest in grap-
pling with this difficult question of differential impact on the free ex-
ercise of religion is the effect already exerted by the massive public
investment in elementary and secondary education. Unlike the situa-
tion when Madison opposed the General Assessment, today there is
no such thing as the exercise of religion free from the distorting im-
pact of state policy, certainly not as concerns education. Thousands,
perhaps millions, of parents who otherwise would send their children
to religious schools do not do so because they cannot afford the tui-
tion on top of the school millage assessments they pay, or because the
alternative of a secular education is so much more economical. More-
over, the expense of operating religious schools is made greater by the
intervention of the state, both by regulations that can impose signifi-
cant costs and by competitive pressure to invest in expensive facilities
and extracurricular activities. This pattern of educational choice has
consequences for the free exercise of religion. In Madison's day, reli-
gions transmitted their traditions and teachings in major part through
the process of providing general education. Madison himself was edu-
cated by clerical tutors and professors of theology.87 If today financial
incentives generated by civil policy induce large numbers of citizens to
decouple education from religion, their free exercise of religion is
impaired, more so than is the case with the other examples listed
above88 of laws and public expenditures that have a differential de-
nominational impact.
This argument may prove too much. If absent a voucher pro-
gram the operation of an ambitious tax-financed system of public edu-
cation burdens the free exercise of religion, perhaps the failure to
enact a voucher system violates Madison's conception of religious lib-
erty. It would be unimaginable for a court to hold that all states or
school districts are constitutionally required to adopt a voucher pro-
gram or an equivalent mechanism for reducing the competitive and
regulatory burdens experienced by religious schools. Of course, in
the Memorial and Remonstrance Madison was not making a constitu-
tional argument before a court of law; he was appealing to the general
public to bring pressure against a proposed piece of legislation.8 9 Part
of the reason we might properly scoff at the claim that the First
Amendment requires educational vouchers is that such a comprehen-
87 See KErcRiAz, supra note 60, at 17-21, 32, 38.
88 See supra text following note 82.
89 He did, however, invoke fundamental principles of political status and structure
and he surely believed that the General Assessment violated the religious liberty article of
the 1776 Virginia Constitution. See Letter from James Madison to ThomasJefferson, supra
note 20, at 419-21.
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sive fiscal restructuring seems quite beyond the judicial commission.
To argue in a legislative forum that due regard for the constitutional
principle of free exercise of religion requires a major alteration of
current practices of educational financing is not nearly so far-fetched.
At a minimum, the adverse impact on free exercise caused by the
preexisting competitive, fiscal, and regulatory practices of the state, an
impact that burdens some religions and their adherents far more than
others, can be a consideration to be balanced against the differential
denominational burdens and benefits of vouchers. No system of edu-
cational financing can avoid this problem of enhancing the free exer-
cise of religion by some while diminishing the free exercise of others.
Although no Madisonian should treat these differential effects as in-
consequential, and although a legislature should make every effort in
the design of a voucher program to reduce or cushion them, as a gen-
eral matter there is no good reason to consider well-conceived and
administered voucher systems more problematic in this respect than
the systems they would replace.
One must be careful not to inflate the argument just sketched
beyond its equality-driven bounds. Were it not for the pressures on
the free exercise of religion created by the system of public education,
any effort by the state to make religious education financially feasible
would be deeply antithetical to Madison's conception of church-state
relations. For as much as he respected the need of persons and
groups to be free to practice their religion according to the dictates of
conscience, he did not believe it is the role of civil authorities and
institutions to encourage or facilitate that practice. The role of the
state, in his conception, is to stay out of the way. The modem system
of public education, by virtue of the incentives it provides and the
costs it imposes, does not satisfy that injunction. A voucher system
that facilitates religious education can be justified in Madisonian
terms only to the degree that it neutralizes the distorting pressure pre-
viously created by the intervention of the state in education.
Madison was concerned about differential denominational im-
pact in practical terms, but also, and perhaps more so, in terms of the
principle of equal civic status. Would a voucher system "degrade[ ]
from the equal rank of Citizens"90 those persons whose religions do
not participate in the expanded civil project of publicly financed edu-
cation for (almost) all? Would the religions that play the largest role
in serving the state's educational purposes achieve over time an infor-
mal civic preeminence? Madison's opposition to the General Assess-
ment derived from his belief that any structural interdependence
between church and state would over time generate corrosive dispari-
90 MADISON, supra note 11, para. 9, at 33.
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ties of civic status. In the case of the effort in post-war Virginia to
teach public morals, some theologies were no doubt better suited for
the task than others, a point not likely to have been lost on state and
local officials.
To examine this dimension of Madison's equality norm as it re-
lates to vouchers, we must again be careful to focus on the incremen-
tal consequences. Already some religions serve the purposes and
projects of the state far better than others. In the realm of education,
many public school districts are utterly dependent on the willingness
and capability of certain local religious institutions to teach large
numbers of students; these districts would be overwhelmed, at least in
the short run, were the religious schools to close. That under pre-
voucher arrangements the state has not enlisted the religious institu-
tions in quite the same way that voucher financing would entail does
not mean that adherents to the assisting religions do not enjoy en-
hanced civic status. The same holds true outside the educational do-
main: some religions are more useful to the state than others in caring
for the poor and the sick, providing disaster relief, and counseling
children at risk. Despite the egalitarian rhetoric of our constitutional
tradition, the fact is that some religions enjoy greater civic status than
others. Probably that will always be true, unless of course civic status
were deemed to be solely a function of formal treatment rather than
informal respect and access, in which case a comprehensive voucher
system would be unproblematic.
An educational voucher system would represent an unprece-
dented level of institutionalization of the financial interdependence
of church and state. That in itself might be troubling. However, in
terms of the risk of degrading the civic status of adherents to religions
that do not well serve the purposes of the state, one might think that
such institutionalization would be a positive development. Perhaps it
is mostly in the unstructured, low-visibility, discretionary instances of
cooperation that civic favoritism flourishes. That the distribution of
government largesse among eligible recipients is controlled in a
voucher system by the choices of parents rather than the decisions of
government officials counts in favor of the arrangement so far as the
impact on civic status is concerned. That a voucher system would in-
crease the number and variety of sects receiving public funds is also
salutary. These can be important considerations but they do not com-
pletely put to rest the problem of unequal civic status. A Madisonian
sensitive to the historical role that religious affiliation has played in
determining civic status should consider any large-scale institutional-
ization of the civic participation of religion to be dangerous, even if
not dispositive against the arrangement.
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I realize that I have not been able to answer these last five Madis-
onian questions relating to incentives and consequences in anything
like a definitive fashion. Another person as steeped in Madison's
ideas as I have been recently could well decide, contrary to myjudg-
ments, that a voucher system that included parochial schools would
cheapen religious authority, create a corrupting dependency, silence
potential critics of government, introduce new sources of civic dis-
cord, and violate fundamental equality norms relating to the free ex-
ercise of religion. Moreover, certain local conditions might so alter
the balance of considerations canvassed above as to make educational
vouchers in that setting inconsistent with Madison's conception of re-
ligious liberty under almost any plausible understanding of his
thought. One such instance would be if a voucher system resulted in
so many students in a school district choosing a particular religious
school that it became the only local educational institution, public or
private, able to provide a decent education. In that event, parents
would be all but required to send their children to the religious
school, however much they objected to the sectarian content of the
curriculum. A closer but nonetheless problematic case would be if
the pattern of choices resulted in a variety of religious schools but no
viable secular schools, public or private. 91
Perhaps the difficulty of these questions proves that we-and
Madison-cannot have it both ways: a multiplicity of politically mobil-
ized but nevertheless distinctive and uncorrupted religious sects that
serve as a check on government, combined with a politics of civility,
moderation, mutual respect, equal civic status, and significant com-
mon ground. At times I wonder. But most of the time I take solace
and inspiration from Madison's example of confronting head-on, and
despite the uncertainties answering as best he could, the most chal-
lenging questions of political institutional design, not least those that
concern the eternally vexed relationship of church and state.
Madison's philosophy of church-state relations cannot decide for us
the constitutionality of school vouchers. But his Memorial and Remon-
strance at least should convince us that we cannot resolve this momen-
tous issue in peremptory fashion by giving controlling weight to the
features of inclusiveness and parental choice (to uphold a voucher
91 Some proponents of vouchers might argue that this type of burden is simply the
converse of the burden borne by parents who object to the secular content of the public
school curriculum (or the curriculum of the secular private school offering the only de-
cent education in town) in locales where the alternative of a religious education is not
viable absent vouchers. The burdens would be symmetrical if, under the condition of no
viable religious schools, the public or secular private schools were teaching atheism or
agnosticism as dogma. The burdens are not symmetrical when children of faith are re-
quired to endure the absence of religion from the curriculum, even if that absence might
reasonably be perceived by them or their parents to imply certain views in tension with
their religious beliefs.
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scheme) or the direct subsidization of purely sectarian teaching (to
strike it down). If Madison's thought can take us beyond such reduc-
tionism, it will have served us well.
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APPENDIX A: MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE#t
We the subscribers, citizens of the said Commonwealth, having
taken into serious consideration, a Bill printed by order of the last
Session of General Assembly, entitled "A Bill establishing a provision
for Teachers of the Christian Religion," and conceiving that the same
if finally armed with the sanctions of a law, will be a dangerous abuse
of power, are bound as faithful members of a free State to remonstrate
against it, and to declare the reasons by which we are determined. We
remonstrate against the said Bill,
1. Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth,
"that Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the man-
ner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction,
not by force or violence." The Religion then of every man must be left
to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of
every man to exercise it as these may dictate. This right is in its nature
an unalienable right. It is unalienable, because the opinions of men,
depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds
cannot follow the dictates of other men: It is unalienable also, because
what is here a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator. It is
the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage and such
only as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent,
both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of
Civil Society. Before any man can be considered as a member of Civil
Society, he must be considered as a subject of the Governour of the
Universe: And if a member of Civil Society, who enters into any
subordinate Association, must always do it with a reservation of his
duty to the General Authority; much more must every man who be-
comes a member of any particular Civil Society, do it with a saving of
his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign. We maintain therefore that
in matters of Religion, no mans right is abridged by the institution of
Civil Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.
True it is, that no other rule exists, by which any question which may
divide a Society, can be ultimately determined, but the will of the ma-
jority; but it is also true that the majority may trespass on the rights of
the minority.
2. Because if Religion be exempt from the authority of the Soci-
ety at large, still less can it be subject to that of the Legislative Body.
The latter are but the creatures and vicegerents of the former. Their
jurisdiction is both derivative and limited: it is limited with regard to
the co-ordinate departments, more necessarily is it limited with regard
to the constituents. The preservation of a free Government requires
tt Source: JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in
JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 29 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
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not merely, that the metes and bounds which separate each depart-
ment of power be invariably maintained; but more especially that
neither of them be suffered to overleap the great Barrier which de-
fends the rights of the people. The Rulers who are guilty of such an
encroachment, exceed the commission from which they derive their
authority, and are Tyrants. The People who submit to it are governed
by laws made neither by themselves nor by an authority derived from
them, and are slaves.
3. Because it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on
our liberties. We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first duty of
Citizens, and one of the noblest characteristics of the late Revolution.
The free men of America did not wait till usurped power had strength-
ened itself by exercise, and entangled the question in precedents.
They saw all the consequences in the principle, and they avoided the
consequences by denying the principle. We revere this lesson too
much soon to forget it. Who does not see that the same authority
which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions,
may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in
exclusion of all other Sects? that the same authority which can force a
citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support
of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other es-
tablishment in all cases whatsoever?
4. Because the Bill violates that equality which ought to be the
basis of every law, and which is more indispensible, in proportion as
the validity or expediency of any law is more liable to be impeached.
If "all men are by nature equally free and independent," all men are
to be considered as entering into Society on equal conditions; as relin-
quishing no more, and therefore retaining no less, one than another,
of their natural rights. Above all are they to be considered as retain-
ing an "equal title to the free exercise of Religion according to the
dictates of Conscience." Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to
embrace, to profess and to observe the Religion which we believe to
be of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose
minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us. If
this freedom be abused, it is an offence against God, not against man:
To God, therefore, not to man, must an account of it be rendered. As
the Bill violates equality by subjecting some to peculiar burdens, so it
violates the same principle, by granting to others peculiar exemptions.
Are the Quakers and Menonists the only sects who think a compulsive
support of their Religions unnecessary and unwarrantable? Can their
piety alone be entrusted with the care of public worship? Ought their
Religions to be endowed above all others with extraordinary privileges
by which proselytes may be enticed from all others? We think too
favorably of the justice and good sense of these denominations to be-
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lieve that they either covet pre-eminences over their fellow citizens or
that they will be seduced by them from the common opposition to the
measure.
5. Because the Bill implies either that the Civil Magistrate is a
competentJudge of Religious Truth; or that he may employ Religion
as an engine of Civil policy. The first is an arrogant pretension falsi-
fied by the contradictory opinions of Rulers in all ages, and through-
out the world: the second an unhallowed perversion of the means of
salvation.
6. Because the establishment proposed by the Bill is not requisite
for the support of the Christian Religion. To say that it is, is a contra-
diction to the Christian Religion itself, for every page of it disavows a
dependence on the powers of this world: it is a contradiction to fact;
for it is known that this Religion both existed and flourished, not only
without the support of human laws, but in spite of every opposition
from them, and not only during the period of miraculous aid, but
long after it had been left to its own evidence and the ordinary care of
Providence. Nay, it is a contradiction in terms; for a Religion not in-
vented by human policy, must have pre-existed and been supported,
before it was established by human policy. It is moreover to weaken in
those who profess this Religion a pious confidence in its innate excel-
lence and the patronage of its Author; and to foster in those who still
reject it, a suspicion that its friends are too conscious of its fallacies to
trust it to its own merits.
7. Because experience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establish-
ments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have
had a contrary operation. During almost fifteen centuries has the le-
gal establishment of Christianity been on trial. What have been its
fruits? More or less in all places, pride and indolence in the Clergy,
ignorance and servility in the laity, in both, superstition, bigotry and
persecution. Enquire of the Teachers of Christianity for the ages in
which it appeared in its greatest lustre; those of every sect, point to the
ages prior to its incorporation with Civil policy. Propose a restoration
of this primitive State in which its Teachers depended on the volun-
tary rewards of their flocks, many of them predict its downfall. On
which Side ought their testimony to have greatest weight, when for or
when against their interest?
8. Because the establishment in question is not necessary for the
support of Civil Government. If it be urged as necessary for the sup-
port of Civil Government only as it is a means of supporting Religion,
and it be not necessary for the latter purpose, it cannot be necessary
for the former. If Religion be not within the cognizance of Civil Gov-
ernment how can its legal establishment be necessary to Civil Govern-
ment? What influence in fact have ecclesiastical establishments had
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on Civil Society? In some instances they have been seen to erect a
spiritual tyranny on the ruins of the Civil authority; in many instances
they have been seen upholding the thrones of political tyranny: in no
instance have they been seen the guardians of the liberties of the peo-
ple. Rulers who wished to subvert the public liberty, may have found
an established Clergy convenient auxiliaries. Ajust Government insti-
tuted to secure & perpetuate it needs them not. Such a Government
will be best supported by protecting every Citizen in the enjoyment of
his Religion with the same equal hand which protects his person and
his property; by neither invading the equal rights of any Sect, nor suf-
fering any Sect to invade those of another.
9. Because the proposed establishment is a departure from that
generous policy, which, offering an Asylum to the persecuted and op-
pressed of every Nation and Religion, promised a lustre to our coun-
try, and an accession to the number of its citizens. What a melancholy
mark is the Bill of sudden degeneracy? Instead of holding forth an
Asylum to the persecuted, it is itself a signal of persecution. It de-
grades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in
Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority. Distant as
it may be in its present form from the Inquisition, it differs from it
only in degree. The one is the first step, the other the last in the
career of intolerance. The magnanimous sufferer under this cruel
scourge in foreign Regions, must view the Bill as a Beacon on our
Coast, warning him to seek some other haven, where liberty and phi-
lanthrophy in their due extent, may offer a more certain repose from
his Troubles.
10. Because it will have a like tendency to banish our Citizens.
The allurements presented by other situations are every day thinning
their number. To superadd a fresh motive to emigration by revoking
the liberty which they now enjoy, would be the same species of folly
which has dishonoured and depopulated flourishing kingdoms.
11. Because it will destroy that moderation and harmony which
the forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with Religion has pro-
duced among its several sects. Torrents of blood have been spilt in
the old world, by vain attempts of the secular ann, to extinguish Relig-
ious discord, by proscribing all difference in Religious opinion. Time
has at length revealed the true remedy. Every relaxation of narrow
and rigorous policy, wherever it has been tried, has been found to
assuage the disease. The American Theatre has exhibited proofs that
equal and compleat liberty, if it does not wholly eradicate it, suffi-
ciently destroys its malignant influence on the health and prosperity
of the State. If with the salutary effects of this system under our own
eyes, we begin to contract the bounds of Religious freedom, we know
no name that will too severely reproach our folly. At least let warning
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be taken at the first fruits of the threatened innovation. The very ap-
pearance of the Bill has transformed "that Christian forbearance, love
and charity," which of late mutually prevailed, into animosities and
jealousies, which may not soon be appeased. What mischiefs may not
be dreaded, should this enemy to the public quiet be armed with the
force of a law?
12. Because the policy of the Bill is adverse to the diffusion of the
light of Christianity. The first wish of those who enjoy this precious
gift ought to be that it may be imparted to the whole race of mankind.
Compare the number of those who have as yet received it with the
number still remaining under the dominion of false Religions; and
how small is the former! Does the policy of the Bill tend to lessen the
disproportion? No; it at once discourages those who are strangers to
the light of revelation from coming into the Region of it; and counte-
nances by example the nations who continue in darkness, in shutting
out those who might convey it to them. Instead of Levelling as far as
possible, every obstacle to the victorious progress of Truth, the Bill
with an ignoble and unchristian timidity would circumscribe it with a
wall of defence against the encroachments of error.
13. Because attempts to enforce by legal sanctions, acts obnox-
ious to so great a proportion of Citizens, tend to enervate the laws in
general, and to slacken the bands of Society. If it be difficult to exe-
cute any law which is not generally deemed necessary or salutary, what
must be the case, where it is deemed invalid and dangerous? And
what may be the effect of so striking an example of impotency in the
Government, on its general authority?
14. Because a measure of such singular magnitude and delicacy
ought not to be imposed, without the clearest evidence that it is called
for by a majority of citizens, and no satisfactory method is yet pro-
posed by which the voice of the majority in this case may be deter-
mined, or its influence secured. "The people of the respective
counties are indeed requested to signify their opinion respecting the
adoption of the Bill to the next Session of Assembly." But the repre-
sentation must be made equal, before the voice either of the Repre-
sentatives or of the Counties will be that of the people. Our hope is
that neither of the former will, after due consideration, espouse the
dangerous principle of the Bill. Should the event disappoint us, it will
still leave us in full confidence, that a fair appeal to the latter will
reverse the sentence against our liberties.
15. Because finally, "the equal right of every citizen to the free
exercise of his Religion according to the dictates of conscience" is
held by the same tenure with all our other rights. If we recur to its
origin, it is equally the gift of nature; if we weigh its importance, it
cannot be less dear to us; if we consult the "Declaration of those rights
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which pertain to the good people of Virginia, as the basis and founda-
tion of Government," it is enumerated with equal solemnity, or rather
studied emphasis. Either then, we must say, that the Will of the Legis-
lature is the only measure of their authority; and that in the plenitude
of this authority, they may sweep away all our fundamental rights; or,
that they are bound to leave this particular right untouched and sa-
cred: Either we must say, that they may controul the freedom of the
press, may abolish the Trial by jury, may swallow up the Executive and
Judiciary Powers of the State; nay that they may despoil us of our very
right of suffrage, and erect themselves into an independent and he-
reditary Assembly or, we must say, that they have no authority to enact
into law the Bill under consideration. We the Subscribers say, that the
General Assembly of this Commonwealth have no such authority: And
that no effort may be omitted on our part against so dangerous an
usurpation, we oppose to it, this remonstrance; earnestly praying, as
we are in duty bound, that the Supreme Lawgiver of the Universe, by
illuminating those to whom it is addressed, may on the one hand, turn
their Councils from every act which would affront his holy preroga-
tive, or violate the trust committed to them: and on the other, guide
them into every measure which may be worthy of his blessing, may
redound to their own praise, and may establish more firmly the liber-
ties, the prosperity and the happiness of the Commonwealth.
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APPENDIX B: GENERAL ASSESSMENTIt
WHEREAS the general diffusion of Christian knowledge hath a natu-
ral tendency to correct the morals of men, restrain their vices, and
preserve the peace of society, which cannot be effected without a com-
petent provision for learned teachers, who may be thereby enabled to
devote their time and attention to the duty of instructing such citi-
zens, as from their circumstances and want of education, cannot oth-
erwise attain such knowledge; and it is judged that such provision may
be made by the Legislature, without counteracting the liberal princi-
ple heretofore adopted and intended to be preserved by abolishing all
distinctions of preeminence amongst the different societies or com-
munities of Christians;
Be it therefore enacted by the General Assembly, That for the
support of Christian teachers, per centum on the amount, or
in the pound on the amount, or in the pound on the sum payable
for tax on the property within this Commonwealth, is hereby assessed,
and shall be paid by every person chargeable with the said tax at the
time the same shall become due; and the Sheriffs of the several Coun-
ties shall have power to levy and collect the same in the same manner
and under the like restrictions and limitations, as are or may be pre-
scribed by the laws for raising the revenues of this State.
And be it enacted, That for every sum so paid, the Sheriff or Col-
lector shall give a receipt, expressing therein to what society of Chris-
tians the person from whom he may receive the same shall direct the
money to be paid, keeping a distinct account thereof in his books.
The Sheriff of every County, shall, on or before the day of in
every year, return to the Court upon oath, two alphabetical lists of the
payments to him made, distinguishing in columns opposite to the
names of the persons who shall have paid the same, the society to
which the money so paid was by them appropriated; and one column
for the names where no appropriation shall be made. One of which
lists, after being recorded in a book to be kept for that purpose, shall
be filed by the Clerk in his office; and the other shall by the Sheriff be
fixed up in the Court-house, there to remain for the inspection of all
concerned. And the Sheriff, after deducting a five per centum for the
collection, shall forthwith pay to such persons or persons as shall be
appointed to receive the same by the Vestry, Elders, or Directors, how-
ever denominated of each such society, the sum so stated to be due to
that society; or in default thereof, upon the motion of such person or
persons to the next or any succeeding Court, execution shall be
awarded for the same against the Sheriff and his security, his and their
ttt Source: THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA,
1776-1787, at 188 (1977).
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executors or administrators; provided that ten days previous notice be
given of such motion. And upon every such execution, the Officer
serving the same shall proceed to immediate sale of the estate taken,
and shall not accept of security for payment at the end of three
months, nor to have the goods forthcoming at the day of sale, for his
better direction wherein, the Clerk shall endorse upon every such exe-
cution that no security of any kind shall be taken.
And be it further enacted, That the money to be raised by virtue
of this act, shall be by the Vestries, Elders, or Directors of each relig-
ious society, appropriated to a provision for a Minister or Teacher of
the Gospel of their denomination, or the providing places of divine
worship, and to none other use whatsoever; except in the denomina-
tions of Quakers and Menonists, who may receive what is collected
from their members, and place it in their general fund, to be disposed
of in a manner which they shall think best calculated to promote their
particular mode of worship.
And be it enacted, That all sums which at the time of payment to
the Sheriff or Collector may not be appropriated by the person paying
the same, shall be accounted for with the Court in manner as by this
Act is directed; and after deducting for his collection, the Sheriff shall
pay the amount thereof (upon account certified by the Court to the
Auditors of Public Accounts, and by them to the Treasurer) into the
Public Treasury, to be disposed of under the direction of the General
Assembly, for the encouragement of seminaries of learning within the
Counties whence such sums shall arise, and to no other use or pur-
pose whatsoever.
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